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Saudi Influence on Islamic Institutions in 
Turkey Beginning in the 1970s 
hakan Köni 
This article investigates the influence of Saudi Arabia on aspects of Islamic social, 
political, and economic life in Turkey. Since the 1970s, long before the rise of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) of today, Turkish-Saudi Arabian relations 
have been characterized by an increasing degree of cooperation, solidarity, and 
partnership centered on certain economic, diplomatic, social, and cultural activi-
ties with a good deal of Islamic content. Turkey’s orientation toward the Middle 
East in general and Saudi Arabia in particular traces to the global oil crisis that 
started in 1973 and its severe effects on the Turkish economy; it also stems from 
some of Turkey’s foreign policy goals with regard to the Cyprus issue and its rela-
tions with regional and global actors. Examples of Saudi influence have included 
the involvement of Saudi-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
multinational corporations (MNCs) in Turkey, Turkey’s membership in the Orga-
nization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and Turkish labor migration to Saudi 
Arabia, with a spillover effect in a wide range of other arenas. This particular 
aspect of Turkish-Saudi Arabian relations is analyzed using the theory of complex 
interdependence, which underscores the importance of economic, social, and cul-
tural issues in international relations in addition to that of traditional political, 
diplomatic, and military goals. 
Islam in Turkey has usually been studied with a focus on its various political, social, 
cultural, and economic aspects. A systematic examination of some extraneous factors 
that have impinged upon these aspects throughout the Turkish Republican era can offer 
a new perspective. Some of these extraneous factors, all of which have influenced Islam 
in Turkey, include the Cold war and the bipolar global political structure; US support 
for religious movements to fight against communism; the establishment of a Jewish 
state in the Middle East and the palestinian Intifada; the 1973 oil crisis and Saudi Ara-
bian international Islamic activism; the Iranian Revolution and Iranian international 
Islamic activism; jihadist movements in Afghanistan and the Caucasus; and labor im-
migration to Europe and the Middle East. The purpose of this article is to offer a theo-
retical and empirical analysis of the Saudi Arabian factor, among others. what are the 
main arenas of Islamic life in Turkey in which Saudi Arabia has been involved, and in 
what ways has this constituted a major variable? who are the main actors? has Saudi 
Arabia promoted “Islamic fundamentalism” in Turkey as it is sometimes claimed? 
This article analyzes these issues from the perspective of the theory of complex 
interdependence, which argues that international relations is not only driven by security 
matters, but also by various economic, social, cultural, ecological, and other concerns 
in varying degrees, as influenced by a plethora of actors that may include members of 
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diplomatic missions, transnational and trans-governmental organizations, intergovern-
mental organizations, individual persons, etc., and which may take place through of-
ficial and unofficial channels. Turkish-Saudi Arabian relations have been characterized 
by an increasing tone of rapprochement, cooperation, and solidarity beginning in the 
1970s, with occasional fluctuations, and relying on some commonly shared historical 
and cultural values in addition to the awareness of shared economic and diplomatic 
interests related to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and ensuing global oil crisis, the Cyprus 
issue, and problems of the Turkish population in Bulgaria, as well as the questions of 
the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the palestinian Intifada. A common theme in 
most of these areas is the shared Islamic identity of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. while 
the aforementioned issues led to closer relations in the 1970s and 1980s, the growing 
cooperation has remained in effect to the present. 
ThE ThEOry Of COMPlEx INTErDEPENDENCE ExPlAINED 
“Complex interdependence” offers a refinement and synthesis of traditionalist 
(realist) and modernist (idealist) theories of international relations, with an argument 
that neither of these two schools presents a complete picture of global politics and that 
in a progressively more sophisticated global political environment, a more accurate 
view could be developed through their amalgamation. Thus, Robert Keohane and Jo-
seph Nye merged parts of each theory with additional empirical analysis to produce the 
theory of complex interdependence. But it could be more accurate to say that complex 
interdependence is a revision of the modernist school, supplemented with some argu-
ments from the traditional school to challenge the traditionalists.1 The theory does not 
reject the realist assumption that military security is a crucial foreign policy goal, but 
it adds that economic, social, cultural, and ecological concerns could also rank high on 
the political agenda with changing degrees of significance.2 
Complex interdependence borrows the idea from the modernist school that the 
nation-state is not the only actor in international relations; many other intergovernmen-
tal, nongovernmental, transnational, social, and cultural actors interact in an interna-
tional system not invariably characterized by a state of anarchy or restricted to matters 
of survival. global politics has gradually evolved into a highly integrated international 
system, where the pursuit of military goals bears enormous costs for all parties. The 
actors have more things to gain through international peace and cooperation, as they are 
much better off when they promote economic, ecological, and social goals. 
In the sphere of international political economy (IpE), complex interdependence 
is similarly closer to the modernist school (idealist, liberal) rather than the realist school, 
which proposes that states gain economic and political advantage only at the expense of 
other states.3 The modernists point out that economic prosperity and political stability 
is highly associated with the promotion of international peace and security. The vol-
1. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2001), 
pp. 3–5.
2. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 3–5, 20–21.
3. Stephen Krasner, “The Accomplishments of International political Economy,” in Steve Smith, 
Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski, eds., International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (New York: 
Cambridge University press, 1996), p. 109.
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ume and kind of interactions among societies have proliferated to such an extent that 
there are more things to gain through economic and political cooperation than through 
aggressive economic policies. Besides, an increasing proliferation of multinational 
corporations (MNCs), predominantly economic entities, challenge the autonomy of 
states.4 In an increasingly integrated world economy, countries are highly susceptible 
to imbalances that could spring from overly aggressive political and economic policies, 
and though states can occasionally opt to pursue a realist foreign policy stance, actors 
are more commonly aware of the advantages that they could gain from international 
peace and cooperation.
Arguing that global politics is shaped by a shifting degree of influence among 
military, economic, social, cultural, and ecological interdependencies, Keohane and 
Nye elaborate a concept of interdependence. They briefly describe it as the mutual 
dependence of actors on each other, as a norm of contemporary global politics. It is a 
process that characteristically limits the autonomy of states to formulate independent 
policies, but also contributes to international peace and environmental protection and 
facilitates global economic growth and welfare. 
The authors introduce the concept of asymmetrical interdependence as a degree 
of imbalance in the dependence of each actor on one another, a process that provides 
relatively less dependent actors with sources of power to apply influence over more de-
pendent ones.5 A distinction is also made between “sensitivity” and “vulnerability” in-
terdependence. Sensitivity refers to situations where liabilities are short-term, limited, 
and small-scale, while vulnerability refers to opposite cases where the liabilities have 
more long-term, deep, and widespread effects stretching over a wide range of areas. 
global politics is thus shaped by asymmetries in interdependence and the sensitivity or 
vulnerability of each actor to these particular liabilities.6 
OIl rEGIMES, ISlAM, AND POlITICS
The oil-producing countries of the Middle East have had a great impact on re-
gional and global politics as a result of their ability, in the 20th century, to secure greater 
control over their domestic oil industries and unite in some international organizations 
with other producing countries to regulate the oil market. Saudi Arabia, as the leading 
actor in the oil supply market, has been particularly successful in leveraging its oil 
power for diplomatic, cultural, economic, and other related purposes. 
The period between the discovery of oil fields in the Middle East and the nation-
alization of the oil industry can be classified as the first oil regime, during which more 
than 50% of extraction, refinery, transportation, and marketing of oil was controlled by 
4. Richard Cooper, “National Economic policy in an Interdependent world Economy,” in george 
T. Crane and Abla Amawi, eds., The Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy (New 
York: Oxford University press, 1991), pp. 110–120; Richard Rosecrance, “The Trading State: Then 
and Now,” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues (New York: harper Collins College publishers, 1996), pp. 344–345, 348; Rich-
ard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, “Interdependence: Myth or Reality,” World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 
(1973), pp. 11–12.
5. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 7–9.
6. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 9–17.
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major industrial states and oil companies. The oil-producing states were substantially 
dependent on these western states and companies. It was during this period that Israel 
was established.7
After the 1940s, growing global oil consumption and the decline of US oil pro-
duction capacity led to the revision of the concession agreements according to which 
owning states would participate in the oil industry with a 50% share of the total profits.8 
Before this, more than 85% of the oil industry was under the control of western states 
and companies. however, though the producing countries secured greater revenues 
from oil production after the 1950s, the oil industry was still not an effective source of 
political or diplomatic influence. 
The emergence of the second oil regime was closely associated with the prime 
of OpEC (the Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries) and OApEC (the Orga-
nization of Arab petroleum Exporting Countries) in the 1970s, uniting the producing 
countries for the control of the oil industry at a time of increasing global oil consump-
tion and depletion of major oil fields in the west. The producing countries were highly 
motivated to nationalize the oil industry and use it as a foreign policy tool. gradually, 
through multilateral negotiations and sometimes unilateral actions by the producing 
countries, these states took control of more than 80% of the oil industry.9 The outbreak 
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the support of major western powers for Israel pro-
vided an opportunity to use that leverage.
During the second oil regime, the Arab-Israeli war triggered an oil embargo that 
severely hit all oil-importing states, some of them being “sensitive” in the sense of 
the term defined earlier, and others “vulnerable.” Turkey was one of those vulnerable 
states, an industrializing country with an acute dependence on imported oil and a deficit 
of currency reserves. Among all imported products, the ratio of currency Turkey spent 
for oil imports between 1973 and 1980 rose from 10% to 50%. The amount spent for 
oil imports was 30% greater than Turkey’s entire export revenues.10 As a consequence, 
Turkey was compelled to re-orient its relations with Saudi Arabia and other OApEC 
countries by improving bilateral and multilateral relations based on economic, politi-
cal, cultural, and social bases, and reinstating its historical common bonds with neigh-
boring Muslim countries, which had been downplayed due to the secular and European 
orientation of the Turkish Republic. This was reflected in Turkey’s membership in the 
Saudi-supported Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, recently renamed the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation) with a gradually increasing level of representa-
tion; Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel, gave legal permission to 
the world Muslim League (wML) and similar international Islamic organizations to 
7. Benjamin Shwadran, Middle East Oil Crisis Since 1973 (Boulder, CO: westview press, 1986), 
pp. 1–7.
8. Shwadran, Middle East Oil Crisis Since 1973, pp. 6–16. 
9. M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, Economic Diplomacy: Embargo leverage and World Politics 
(Boulder, CO: westview press, 1985), pp. 83–116; Shwadran, Middle East Oil Crisis Since 1973, pp. 
72–77; Benjamin Shwadran, Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman 
pub. Co., 1977), pp. 66–71; Richard Chadbourn weisberg, The Politics of Crude Oil Pricing in the 
Middle East, 1970–1975: A Study in International Bargaining (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Interna-
tional Studies-University of California, 1977), pp. 78–84.
10. Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics, trans. by Emanuel Lottem (Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), pp. 29–31.
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establish contacts with religious actors in Turkey, granted permission to foreign compa-
nies to open branches of Islamic banking and finance institutions, and increased labor 
immigration to Saudi Arabia. 
 
COMPlEx INTErDEPENDENCE IN SAuDI ArABIA’S INfluENCE ON 
ISlAM IN TurKEy
for Saudi Arabia, Islam has been crucial to domestic and foreign policy goals as 
one of its leading sources of political legitimacy. Opposition to the infiltration of com-
munism into the Arabian peninsula, defense of the rights of Arabs and Muslims, and 
concern for and promotion of solidarity among Muslim nations were among the key 
elements of Saudi foreign policy.11
Domestic actors shaping Saudi Arabian politics included the royal family, the Al 
Shaykh (descendants of Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-wahhab) family, mainstream ‘ulama’, 
radical ‘ulama’, and other notables, all of whom shared a strong sense of concern for 
these foreign policy goals. These actors have been particularly united in their strong 
desire and support for the establishment of a palestinian state with Jerusalem as its 
capital, and have defined Saudi attitudes toward Israel as well as toward third parties, 
including Muslim countries and other states.12 King faisal (ruled 1964–1975) institu-
tionalized this orientation and his successors followed suit. faisal dreamed of recover-
ing Jerusalem and praying in al-Aqsa before his death, and called for Arab and Muslim 
states to unite against Israel and international communism, describing them as products 
of western imperialism and atheism.13
Consequently, Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic relations with Turkey were aimed at 
promoting Turkish support of the Arab position, as well as uniting all Muslim countries 
around common religious goals.
The energy crisis, and its continued impact after the 1979 Revolution in Iran, af-
fected Turkey much more severely than any other western country. Turkey was suffer-
ing under measures of energy austerity, limitations on domestic fuel sales, and frequent 
power cuts. The rise of the price of oil in international markets brought the oil-depen-
dent domestic industries to a grinding halt and paralyzed the transportation system, 
hospitals, and educational institutions. Economic considerations thus played a leading 
role in determining the tenets of Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. Tur-
key was in need of a stable supply of oil and needed to increase its export revenues to 
meet its growing expenditures on the import of oil.14 
Turkey’s foreign policy agenda in the 1970s and its need for oil supplies and credits 
to mitigate its domestic economic situation helped channel its relations with the King-
dom in specific directions. Turkey sought to develop relations with the Muslim world 
to offset deteriorating relations with the west resulting from its operation in Cyprus in 
11. Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy (New York: praeger, 1976), p. 89.
12. paul Aarts and gerd Nonneman, Saudi Arabia in Balance: Political Economy, Society, foreign 
Affairs (New York: New York University press, 2005), pp. 338–340.
13. Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy, pp. 70–71.
14. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Security and the Middle East,” foreign Affairs (fall 1983), 
pp. 3–8; Alon Liel, Turkey in the Middle East, pp. 27–45; Interview by the author with Korkut Özal, 
february 2008, Istanbul.
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1974 that caused a serious diplomatic crisis. Despite its role as a western ally, Turkey 
was subjected to an embargo lasting for five years. In order to break this isolation, and 
to draw greater attention to the problems of the Turkish population in Bulgaria, Turkish 
foreign policy increased its orientation to the Middle East and the OIC.15
These factors helped persuade Turkey to modify its policies in the 1970s in the direc-
tion of OIC and Arab positions.16 Let us examine the emergence of this particular factor 
in Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia, with reference to the role of multinational, non-
governmental, and intergovernmental organizations and actors (MNCs, NgOs and IOs). 
Examples of MNCs and NgOs coming into contact with actors and areas of Is-
lamic life in Turkey include Saudi Arabian or Saudi-partnered private Islamic banks, 
the world Muslim League, and similar associations and foundations. Saudi Arabia-
based MNCs working in the banking sector in Turkey, particularly faisal finance and 
Albaraka Turk, have been active in organizing and sponsoring a great many social, 
cultural, and political activities in Turkey. In carrying out this mission, they worked in 
partnership with leading Turkish individuals and families such as the Özal family, the 
Topbaş family, Tevfik paksu, and Salih Özcan, to provide them with employment in the 
administrative, economic, and social sectors.17
Agents of international banks were not allowed to enter Turkish markets until 
1983, when prime Minister Turgut Özal spearheaded the construction of the legal in-
frastructure offering operational space to private banking in Turkey. Though Islamic 
banking has not constituted a substantial proportion of the Turkish banking sector in 
the years since its emergence, it is important in the context of its character and relation-
ship with Islamic life in Turkey. whether they are domestic or external, these banks are 
characterized by an alternative style of banking, with their particularly Islamic funds 
and credits used in business, real estate, and transportation.18 Among the members of 
the founding committee of Albaraka Turk were Korkut Özal, brother of Turgut Özal, 
and Eymen Topbaş, in addition to other leading persons and companies. Korkut Özal 
and Eymen Topbaş were active in various areas of Turkish political, social, and eco-
nomic life even before their service in Albaraka Turk. Korkut Özal, for instance, was a 
leading party member in the National View movement led by Necmettin Erbakan and 
contributed to the formation of the policy and programmatic orientation of the party. he 
later transferred to the Motherland party founded by his brother Turgut Özal. Together 
with a number of others, he was encouraged by Mehmet Zahit Kotku, the leader of the 
15. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Turkey’s Attitude towards the Middle East Conflict,” foreign Policy, 
Vol. 5, No. 4 (1976), p. 31; for the Cyprus issue, see Ayhan Kamel, “Türkiye’nin Arap Dünyasıyla 
Ilişkileri” [“Turkey’s Relations with the Arab world”], Dış Politika, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1976), pp. 12–14; 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik:Türkiye’nin uluslararası Konumu [Strategic Analysis: Turkey’s 
Global Position] (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), pp. 249, 259.
16. Ali Karaosmanoğlu, “Islam and foreign policy: A Turkish perspective,” foreign Policy, Vol. 
12, Nos. 1–2 (June 1985), p. 69.
17. faik Bulut, Tarikat Sermayesi-II yeşil Sermaye Nereye? Islamcı Sermaye Nereye? [Capital 
of the religious Order II, Where Does the Green Capital Go? Where does the Islamic Capital Go?] 
(Istanbul: Su Yayinevi, 1999); Samim güner, “Tarikat Sermayesi,” http://www.osmanakbasak.com/
Samim%20g%fCner/Tarikat%20Sermayesi.htm.
18. generally, Islamic finance is characterized by the avoidance of charging a set interest rate to 
avoid the religious prohibition against usury. Instead, these institutions operate on the basis of shared 
profit/loss. Interview by the author with Korkut Özal, february 2008, Istanbul.
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Iskenderpaşa community in Turkey that is connected to the gumushanevi lodge of the 
halidiye branch of the Nakshibendi order in Turkey, to enter political life in the early 
years of his career to represent the voice of the religious right. Many of the leading po-
litical figures of the Turkish religious right, including Necmettin Erbakan, Turgut Özal, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Korkut Özal, Recai Kutan, and Ahmet Tekdal, were notably 
followers of this community prior to their rise in political life.19 
Korkut Özal was elected as parliamentarian from the National Salvation party 
and Motherland party a number of times and was also entrusted with certain ministerial 
and deputy positions in various government formations and in the Islamic Develop-
ment Bank, a subsidiary organ of the Organization of Islamic Conference.20
Eymen Topbaş was the then-head of the Motherland party (ANAp) in Istanbul 
province in addition to being a leading member of the influential Topbaş family. Other 
members of his family were active in various religious associations and foundations 
in addition to their political careers even before their association with Saudi Arabian 
capital.21 The partnership of the Özal and Topbaş families in Albaraka Turk contributed 
to their economic power, which increased their influence in Turkish business and eco-
nomic life and also allowed them to participate in religious civil society with greater 
impact. The Bereket foundation was established by the Topbaş family, Albaraka Turk, 
and a number of other influential families. Korkut Özal, for his part, was the founder 
of the Özbağ foundation.22 Before their service in Albaraka Turk, Korkut Özal and 
Eymen Topbaş were working together on the managing committee of Ilim yayma Vakfi 
19. Yıldız Atasoy, Turkey Islamists and Democracy: Transition and Globalization in a Muslim 
State (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 81–83; radikal, “Nakşibendi Şeyhi Öldü” [“The 
Nakshibandi Shaykh has passed Away”], May 2, 2001; Emin Yaşar Demirci, “Tasavvuf Geleneği 
ve Iskenderpaşa Cemaati” [“Sufi Tradition and Iskenderpasha Community”], Eğitim Bilim Dergisi 
[Journal of Educational Sciences], (March 2001); Metin heper and Şule Toktaş, “Islam, Modernity 
and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,” The Muslim World, 
Vol. 93 (April 2003).
20. Atasoy, Turkey Islamists and Democracy, pp. 124, 151; Işık Binyılı [light Millennium], “Kor-
kut Özal,” September 25, 1998.
21. hikmet Çetinkaya, “Albaraka’dan AKP’ye” [“from Albaraka to the Justice and Development 
party”], Cumhuriyet, August 26, 2003; Erbil Tuşalp, “Kimin Eli Kimin Cebinde?” [“whose hand in 
whose pocket?”], Birgun, September 11, 2005.
22. Mumcu, rabıta [The league] (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1997), pp. 144–147. As the material in this 
article dealing with the world Muslim League draws extensively from Mumcu’s work, some background 
is in order. Uğur Mumcu was an investigative journalist who wrote in Cumhuriyet as a columnist between 
1975 and 1991. he could be classified as an independent member of the state elites working among its 
media affiliates who described himself as a loyal defender of Turkish secularism and republicanism. he 
often wrote on issues of corruption, terrorism, links of regional and global powers with pKK terrorism, 
the Kurdish issue, and Islamic communities and Sufi orders and their financial and ideological links with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran. he was assassinated in front of his house in 1993 by a bomb planted in his car; his 
assassins were never found. Mumcu’s sensational book rabıta is written as an investigative journalistic 
piece of work on a number of issues which include, first, the links of some Islamic communities and groups 
in Europe — like the followers of Cemalettin Kaplan and Ahmet Kütahyalı; European National View Or-
ganization; Süleymancılar; Nurcular; and the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs — with Iranian and 
Saudi funds and religious doctrines, and their goals to introduce Islamic law in Turkey. And secondly, and 
most importantly, it documents the financial, ideological, and organizational relations of the world Muslim 
League with various religious communities, Sufi orders, Islamic banks, foundations, associations, publish-
ers, Turkish statesmen, officials, ministries, and various public and private personalities in Turkey. 
104 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
[the foundation for promulgation of Knowledge] in the 1970s. 
The other Saudi-backed Islamic bank, faisal finance, was owned by Saudi Ara-
bian prince Muhammad al-faisal, who chose Salih Özcan and Tevfik paksu to establish 
the Bank. Salih Özcan was also an active member of the world Muslim League, a rep-
resentative of the National Salvation party, and owner of an Islamic magazine called 
hilal [Crescent] in addition to his activism in many other Islamic organizations. faisal 
finance had a number of other partners in addition to prince Muhammad al-faisal, in-
cluding the Darul Malul Islami Trust and Islamic Insurance Institution [Islami Tekaful 
Kuumu] whose president was Mehmet Erdoğan Sergici, a Turkish national. In return 
for their service in faisal finance, Salih Özcan, Tevfik paksu, and a number of Turkish 
partner companies were granted shares from the bank. The shares held by Salih Özcan 
and Tevfik paksu were later distributed to 93 persons who were deemed to be very 
influential social, political, and economic actors in Turkey.23 Uğur Mumcu claims that 
Albaraka Turk and faisal finance funded the paper expenses of more than 50 publish-
ing companies, newspapers, and magazines known for their religious activities.24 
Apart from these MNCs, there has been much religious involvement between 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey via NgOs, of which the world Muslim League (wML) has 
been the most famous. The wML was established in 1965 by King faisal to serve as 
an international Islamic cooperation, missionary, solidarity, and charity foundation. It 
put particular emphasis on supporting the knowledge and practice of Islamic principles 
and provisions for all Muslims around the world. One thing needs to be stressed about 
wML: in its founding charter it states that the organization respects legal limitations in 
secular states with Muslim populations and does not attempt to overturn the political 
regime.25 But within this limitation, the wML provided funds for many Islamic activi-
ties and worked in coordination with many similar actors in Turkey.26 Their activities 
generally included donations and funding for activities, the organization of conferences 
and youth camps, publications, and the construction of mosques and Islamic centers.27 
The founding members of wML included two Turkish nationals, Salih Özcan 
and Ahmet gürkan. Salih Özcan’s religious profile is explained above. As for Ahmet 
gürkan, he was the president of the Turkish-Saudi Arabian friendship Association and 
a former parliamentarian. Ahmet gürkan was the representative of the Justice party 
who submitted the legal proposal for the amendment of the penal code pertaining to 
23. Mumcu, rabıta, pp. 142–144, 148.
24. Mumcu, rabıta, pp. 142–144, 148; also in the archive documents of Directorate general of 
foundations; Interview by the author with Davut Dursun, December 2007, Ankara.
25. The wML’s establishment and constitution can be seen in “Beginning of the Rabita: In the 
Shade of Baitullah,” The Muslim World league Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 1–2, (September–October 
1987). 
26. Interview by the author with Emin Saraç, January 2008, Istanbul; Interview by the author with 
Tayyar Altıkulaç, January 2008, Ankara.
27. A number of others could be added to these, such as Deniz feneri yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma 
Derneği [Deniz feneri Cooperation and Solidarity Association], Başkent Kadın Platformu Derneği 
[Capital women’s platform Association], rumeli Türkleri Kültür ve Dayanışma Vakfı [Rumelian 
Turks Culture and Solidarity foundation], Türk ve Ortadoğu Dayanışma Vakfı [Turkish and Middle 
East Solidarity foundation]; Official document provided in response to information request by author 
to Turkish Ministry of the Interior, Ankara, Turkey, January 2008. Interview by the author with Emin 
Saraç, January 2008, Istanbul; Interview by the author with Tayyar Altıkulaç, January 2008, Ankara.
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the recitation of prayer calls in Arabic.28 A later member of the wML from Turkey was 
Vice Director of Turkish Religious Affairs Yaşar Tunagür. 
A dramatic example of wML’s involvement with Turkey, which was given a great 
deal of space in Mumcu’s book, was its payment of the salaries of official Turkish 
imams working in Europe. An agreement was signed between Turkish governmental 
agents and representatives of the wML to pay the salaries of more than 70 imams for 
a period of two years between 1982 and 1984.29 Some other well-known examples 
of the wML’s Islamic activities include donations for the construction of the Turkish 
National Assembly Mosque and Kocatepe Mosque, Middle East Technical University 
and Ankara University mosques and Islamic Centers, and the repair and restoration of 
flood-damaged mosques in Adana province.30 The proposal for the Middle East Techni-
cal University campus project was presented by Korkut Özal, a teaching faculty at this 
university, who received harsh criticism from the secularist intelligentsia in Turkey for 
this proposal. There was a sizable money transfer for these projects, but the funding 
was not always employed for the desired projects due to the legal and social reactions 
against them. The activists were fearful of the secularist backlash that could originate 
from the state elites — army, judiciary, media, and various civil society organizations 
— who might accuse them of violating the secularist principle in the constitution and 
cooperating with foreigners for this purpose. 
Apart from these, the wML periodically organizes the international Islamic Seerat 
Congress to promote the education, practice, and spread of Islamic norms throughout 
the Muslim world. Turkey has participated in this Congress officially for some time. 
Turkey joined in the 1976 Congress held in pakistan at a ministerial level, represented 
by the state minister hasan Aksay.31 Among the activities of this Congress were pay-
ments made to teachers of Arabic language at gazi and Ankara Universities.32 
Among other conferences organized by the wML in Turkey, the Islamic Student 
Union Conference was held on July 1, 1977 in Istanbul to promote unity and solidarity 
among Muslim student associations in Turkey. Another was held in Damascus in 1977 
during which the founder of the Nurcu movement in Turkey, Said Nursi, was presented 
as an exemplary scholar to be followed by Turkish people. Nurcuism (or the Nurcu 
Movement) is a religious movement that spread in Turkey starting in the early years of 
the 20th century and is based on the teachings and the worldview propagated by Said 
Nursi in his collection of books named as risale-i Nur Külliyatı [Booklets of light]. 
Said Nursi is portrayed by his followers as a distinguished Islamic scholar, activist, and 
leader whose contemporary exegesis of the Qur’an is said to provide solutions to the 
social, political, economic, religious, and other puzzles of the time.33 
A more provocative action by the wML was the visit of the Egyptian Islamist 
Sayyid Qutb’s brother, Muhammad Qutb, to Turkey. while working at a university 
28. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 138–140.
29. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 168–243; Cumhuriyet, “rabıta Parasıyla Kilit Noktalarda” [“Rabita is at 
Key points with Its Money”], November 19, 2007.
30. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 198–200; Interview by the author with Emin Saraç, January 2008, Istanbul.
31. Mumcu, rabita, p. 140.
32. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 246–248.
33. Risale-i Nur Enstitüsü, “Bediüzzaman Said Nursi,” Köprü (Spring 2000); Ahmet Demir, 
“Bediüzzaman Said Nursi hazretleri,” Mevzuat Dergisi, Vol. 1, No. 8 (August 1998). 
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in Saudi Arabia, where he was devoted to developing and propagating his brother’s 
scholarly works on Islamic political ideals and ways, Muhammad Qutb was hired by 
the wML to establish communications with various Islamic communities and agencies 
in the wider Islamic world. his visit was very much opposed by Turkish officials, as he 
had previously described Turkey as part of the “land of war” (Dar al-harb, or outside 
the land of Islam) because it embodied secularism. According to him, then, Muslims 
were supposed to unite around domestic Islamic political movements who were trying 
to promote shari‘a.34 
A book published by the wML entitled A World Guide to Organizations of Islamic 
Activities in Cooperation with rabita gives the names of foundations and associations that 
were branches and representatives of the wML in Turkey.35 They include the Turkish Na-
tional Student Union, Eastern Turkestan Immigrants foundation, Istanbul University Islamic 
Research Institute, Izmir National Turkish foundation for Building and Sheltering Is-
lamic Institutes, Cyprus Turkish Islamic Association, Turkish-Saudi Arabian fellowship 
foundation, Turkish-Saudi Arabian parliament fellowship Association, and Radio Turkish 
Voice in Australia.36 The religious activities of these entities include contributions to mosque 
and religious center construction; organizing conferences and symposiums; publishing 
books, magazines, and newspapers; and giving scholarships to university students.37 In the 
case of Northern Cyprus, it appears that relations with the wML were more official. On one 
occasion, ex-president Rauf Denktaş states that they received the sum of $657, 000 from the 
wML for a grant payment.38 
As one example of the interconnected relationships of some of these actors, the 
vice-director of the Istanbul University Institute of Islamic Research was Salih Tuğ, 
who was formerly on the management board of Ilim yayma Vakfı [the foundation for 
promulgation of Knowledge] with Korkut Özal and Eymen Topbaş. Salih Tuğ then 
became president of Aydınlar Ocağı [Intelligentsia foundation] and he was also on the 
managing board of ISAV (the foundation for Islamic Research).39 
Some controversial issues associated with wML’s activities related to Turkey in-
clude the publication of a book about Atatürk entitled Sanem Adam – Put Adam (Arabic 
and Turkish, respectively, for “Idol Man”) in Beirut and another, Islam Perspektifleri 
[Islamic Perspectives], by the Istanbul University Islamic Research Institute, an in-
stitution that was a branch of the wML in Turkey. In both of these books, Atatürk is 
portrayed as destructive for Islam on account of his abolition of the Caliphate, adoption 
of western legal and political systems, and social and cultural reforms that prohibited 
religion in the public sphere.40
34. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 332–333.
35. A World Guide to Organizations of Islamic Activities in Cooperation with rabita (Mecca: world 
Muslim League, N.D.).
36. The original names of these entities in Turkish are as follows in order: Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, 
Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği, Istanbul Üniversitesi Islami Araştırmalar Enstitüsü, Milli Türk Izmir yük-
sek Islam Enstitüsü yaptırma ve Koruma Derneği, Kıbrıs Türk Islam Cemiyeti, Türk-Suudi Dostluk Derneği, 
Turk-Suudi Parlemento Dostluk Cemiyeti and Avustralya Türk Sesi radyosu.
37. Cited in Mumcu, rabita, pp. 199, 209–210, 220–222, 278; Interview by the author with Emin 
Saraç, January 2008, Istanbul.
38. Mumcu, rabita, p. 243; Interview by the author with Tayyar Altıkulaç, January 2008, Ankara.
39. Mumcu, rabita, p. 151.
40. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 254–255. 
SAUDI INfLUENCE ON ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN TURKEY M 107
The wML has also been similarly active in Europe, where there are more than 
two million Turks. The most prominent entity assisted by the wML was the Center for 
Islamic Culture headquartered in Belgium. Islam was recognized as an official religion 
in Belgium after the 1974 oil crisis. Thus, management of Islamic organizations in 
Belgium and the Netherlands was given to Saudi Arabia. In Belgium alone, for in-
stance, there were 155 Islamic centers established or maintained by Saudi Arabia.41 The 
Belgian Center for Islamic Culture was the headquarters for all the Islamic centers in 
Europe. The administrative board of this center included ambassadors of five Islamic 
countries, including Turkey, and another four members appointed by the wML. Aid 
and assistance to other Islamic centers in Europe was distributed through this center. 
Similarly, Islamic centers established in other European countries also included official 
members such as diplomats and personnel of the Turkish directorate of religious affairs 
as well as civilian members of Turkish origin.42 
After the examination of the Islamic content in transnational and trans-govern-
mental relations, we now come to those involving international organizations (IOs). 
IOs are institutions that can provide weak states with platforms for forming coalitions 
and establishing linkages between issues.43 for our purposes, OpEC, OApEC, and the 
OIC appear as the three most important IOs providing oil-producing Arab states with 
huge resources of power and activism. OpEC and OApEC facilitated oil-producing 
Arab states’ participation in and nationalization of their oil industries. They have al-
lowed their members to use control over oil production as leverage in attaining politi-
cal, diplomatic, and social gains. The Arabs were able to use their control of oil trade, 
price, and production as leverage for promoting their goals in other areas. They started 
to adjust the price and amount of oil in the market according to the willingness of their 
counterparts to provide some returns. The OIC, on the other hand, provided its member 
states with a platform to promote their common political, economic, and social goals. 
Turkey’s membership and activism in the OIC was meaningful in the context of Islamic 
political economy at a governmental and diplomatic level. It was expected that Turkey 
would attain some privileged status among the oil-importing countries as manifested 
by low oil prices, financial grants and credits to meet its growing energy expenses, and 
diplomatic support for its involvement in Cyprus and minority issues of Bulgaria.44 
The nature of Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and with these international 
organizations, changed noticeably after the oil crisis of 1973. In 1969, Turkish foreign 
policy was characteristically concerned with regional and global power balances with-
out much regard for cultural issues. Turkey’s participation in the OIC, with an increas-
ingly higher level of representation, was a sign of a substantial change in its traditional 
foreign policy orientation, from a highly rational to a partially social and cultural one. 
Turkey participated in the first and the second OIC summits, held in Rabat in 1969 and 
in Lahore in 1974 at the level of its Minister of foreign Affairs, one level below that 
41. Mumcu, rabita, pp. 77–79.
42. “Muslims in Europe: An Up to Date on Mosque projects,” The Muslim World league Journal 
Vol. 9, No. 7 (May 1982); Comite de la Mosquée de Bruxelles, Mission de la Mosquée: Bulletin 
Islamique et Culturel [Mission of the Mosque: Islamic and Cultural Bulletin], pp. 17–21; Mumcu, 
rabıta, p. 77.
43. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence. 
44. Interview by the author with Korkut Özal, february 2008, Istanbul.
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of other countries. During the third summit held in Ta’if in 1981, it was raised to the 
level of prime Minister. At the fourth and fifth summits, held in Casablanca in 1984 
and Kuwait in 1987, Turkey was represented by the president, one level higher than the 
other participating countries.45
Its relations with Arab states had previously been shaped by the dynamics of the 
Cold war which required Turkey to join the western bloc due to its security concerns. 
This was reflected in its relations with its Arab neighbors, as Turkey was largely unin-
terested in their policy concerns, especially vis-à-vis Israel.46 
As Turkey’s policies shifted towards increased relations with Saudi Arabia, so too 
did its foreign policy priorities: first, to provide diplomatic support to the Arabs; sec-
ond, to prevent its relations with the west from deteriorating due to its improved rela-
tions with the Arab states; third, to keep its level of relations with Israel at a minimum; 
and fourth, to improve its relations with the Arab countries in a multidimensional way 
for cooperation in political, economic, technical, and commercial areas.47 
The process, ending with Turkey’s participation in the OIC, was very controver-
sial. Turkey’s type of OIC membership also changed; it began as a preliminary member 
as it did not approve the OIC Charter because it was found to be in opposition to the 
secularist principle in the Constitution, and also because the leftist Republican people’s 
party in the parliament opposed Turkey’s participation in Islamic forums and organiza-
tions. But due to eminent foreign policy concerns, such as the oil crisis and the Cyprus 
issue, Turkish Minister of foreign Affairs Şükrü Elekdağ announced — before Islamic 
foreign ministers convened in Istanbul in 1976 — the government’s decision to ratify 
the OIC Constitution to remove the last barrier to full membership. Yet Turkey main-
tained its reservations on the type of decisions that could bring it into conflict with the 
principles of Turkish secularism and its membership in the UN.48
The oil crisis directly affected Turkey’s approach to the OIC. At the Lahore 
Summit in 1974, Turkey approved some of the OIC decisions, but it did not agree to 
demands that Turkey sever its relations with Israel. Turkey was then denied funding 
from the Islamic Development Bank in order to encourage its full membership in the 
organization and application of all OIC decisions.49 Turkey quickly reacted to this by 
raising the level of its participation in the traditional OIC foreign ministers’ meeting to 
match those of other members. while it had joined the earlier fifth meeting at the level 
of Directorate-general of the foreign Office, it was declared that Turkey would be rep-
resented in the sixth foreign ministers’ meeting in Jidda by Minister of foreign Affairs 
Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil. In return, Turkey’s request to invite the president of the Turk-
ish Cypriot community, Rauf Denktaş, to make a speech at the summit was accepted. 
45. Liel, Turkey in the Middle East, p. 139; Mahmut Bali Aykan, “Turkey and the OIC: 1984-
1992,” Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk yıllığı [Turkish yearbook of International relations], Vol. 
23 (1997), http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/44/683/8691.pdf. 
46. Karaosmanoğlu, “Islam and foreign policy,” pp. 3–5; Bülent Aras, Turkey and the Greater 
Middle East (Istanbul: Tasam publications, 2004), p. 55; Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Turkey’s Attitude,” pp. 
28–31; Ayhan Kamel, “Türkiye’nin Arap Dünyasıyla Ilişkileri” [“Turkey’s Relations with the Arab 
world”], pp. 5–12. . 
47. Ayhan Kamel, “Türkiye’nin Arap Dünyasıyla Ilişkileri” [“Turkey’s Relations with the Arab 
world”], pp.14–17.
48. Liel, Turkey and the Middle East, 140–142; Aykan, “Turkey and the OIC.”
49. hürriyet, May 6, 1974. 
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Turkey was also allowed to host the next OIC meeting in Istanbul.
for similar economic and diplomatic considerations, Turkey recognized the pal-
estine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of palestine and established 
diplomatic relations with it by permitting it to open offices in Ankara in 1976. Turkey 
agreed to support anti-Israeli decisions made by the OIC by “downsizing” but not end-
ing its relations with Israel.50 In return, Turkey was allowed to invite a representative 
from the Turkish Cypriot community to all OIC meetings and the Conference recog-
nized the existence of two equal communities on the island. Second, Turkey’s call to 
hold the OIC meeting for Islamic ministers of economy, industry, and technology was 
accepted, which took place in October 1977. Turkey also saw benefits from this ap-
proach to the OIC. In 1979, for instance, Turkish finance Minister Ismet Sezgin went to 
Riyadh with a formal request for a $1 billion loan. After negotiations of financial credits that 
lasted for more than a year, Saudi Arabia agreed to loan $250 million to Turkey. Interestingly, 
the transfer date of this loan coincided with Turkey’s announcement of its decision to down-
grade its diplomatic relations with Israel.51
finally, Turkish labor immigration to Saudi Arabia is another arena that has in-
directly affected religious life in Turkey.52 Saudi Arabia depends on an expatriate labor 
force; Turkey sought to develop its trade relations with OpEC due to its domestic eco-
nomic crisis and the declining volume of economic relations with the west. According to 
the data provided by the Turkish Employment Institution, the number of Turkish workers 
moving to Saudi Arabia was more than 450,000 between 1975 and 2005. The number 
of Turkish companies operating in Saudi Arabia and their activities also increased. Their 
number was 10 in 1978, 19 in 1981, 79 in 1982, and 109 in 1983. The value of their con-
tracts was previously about $3.3 billion and increased to $5 billion in 1988.53 
The opportunity to work in proximity to the Islamic holy cities appealed to the 
religious sentiment of the workers. Moreover, many of the workers were able to per-
form their religious duty of pilgrimage during their employment in Saudi Arabia. The 
influence of labor immigration on the religious life of the workers was also observed 
by the leading politicians of the time during their meetings with Saudi Arabian officials 
and visits to Saudi Arabia.54
50. Bülent Aras, Turkey, pp. 55–59; Meltem Müftülüer, in hasan Köni, ed., The Contribution of 
Turkey for reconstruction and Development of Palestine (Ankara: University and friedrich Naumann 
foundation in Turkey, 1995), pp. 17–18.
51. Mumcu, rabıta, pp. 345–346; Liel, Turkey in the Middle East, pp. 113–114; Interview by the author 
with Şevket Kazan, December 2007, Ankara. 
52. Official document provided in response to information request by author to Turkish Employ-
ment Institution, Ankara, Turkey, January 2008.
53. Karaosmanoğlu, “Turkey’s Security,” pp. 6–8; Official document provided in response to in-
formation request by author to Turkish Employment Institution, Ankara, Turkey, January 2008.
54. Başbakan Turgut Özal’ın Konuşma, Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mülakatları, 13.12.1085 – 12.12.1986 
[Speeches, Messages, releases and Interviews of Prime Minister Turkut Özal, 13.12.1085 – 2.12.1986] 
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CONCluSION
As a consequence of a number of developments taking place after the 1970s, 
Saudi Arabia increased its impact on various aspects of Islamic life in Turkey, though 
on a limited scale. Areas of common concern and mutual benefit facilitated the intro-
duction of Saudi Arabian capital, MNCs, and NgOs with elements of religious content 
in Turkey; Turkey’s minimization of its diplomatic relations with Israel; and Turkey’s 
participation in the OIC with an increasingly higher level of representation, particularly 
with regard to Turkish-Saudi Arabian cooperation in Europe. 
The emergence of this particular kind of relationship between two countries is 
explained with the aid of the theory of complex interdependence which advocates that 
international relations is not limited to security matters only. Rather, economic, diplo-
matic, social, and cultural issues can also be the primary goals of bilateral, multilateral, 
and multidimensional relations with the participation of state and non-state actors, as 
is observed in our case.
POSTSCrIPT: uNDEr ThE AKP TODAy
Turkish-Saudi Arabian relations have shown a trend towards even greater cooper-
ation and proximity during the period of Justice and Development party (AKp) govern-
ment in power in recent years; a future study of this subject is projected. Influential in 
this process is thought to be the increasing Saudi foreign policy objective of mitigating 
its dependency on the US and the west, and its concerns about intense US involvement 
in the Middle East. Both countries have united in actions to combat al-Qa‘ida terror-
ism, but they have also expressed their concerns about the US war in Iraq. In february 
2005, the two countries signed a security cooperation agreement. Again in early 2005, 
a Turkish national, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu, became president of the OIC, which meant 
deeper and more active Turkish involvement with the goals and issues of the organiza-
tion. Yet the AKp government has also put its mark on the organization by calling for 
the urgent need to press for political reforms for a more democratic and liberal Middle 
East, combined with Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East.55 Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia have signed more than ten agreements, conventions, protocols, and understand-
ings under AKp governments in various political, military, economic, social, and other 
areas — almost as much as the number of all the agreements signed between the two 
countries until 2002. In 2006, the two countries agreed to establish a “medical city” in 
Istanbul, to be built by Saudi-german hospital Company with an investment value of 
$13 billion USD. In 2006, the Saudi King visited Turkey to be followed by a second 
visit in 2007. The high-level visits by Saudi Arabia have been reciprocated with the 
visits of the Turkish prime Minister, Minister of foreign Affairs, and other ministers. 
55. Muhittin Ataman, “Türkiye-Suudi Arabistan Ilişkileri: Temkinli Ilişkilerden Çok Taraflı 
Birlikteliğe” [“Turkish-Saudi Arabian Relations: from Cautious Association to Multilateral Coopera-
tion”], Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol. 1, No. 9 (September 2009), pp. 72–81. 
